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Comment
Pennsylvania's Mental Health Procedures Act
I.. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Mental Health
Procedures Act' in an attempt to put due process "teeth" into the
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of 1966.2 The enactment
was a response to court decisions3 holding that the 1966 law, which
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
2. Id. §§ 4401-4408 (Purdon 1969).
3. See, e.g., Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 45 U.S.L.W. 4 451 (U.S. May 16, 1977); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966
(M.D. Pa. 1971). See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Heryford v. Parker,
396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976);
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384
F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
202 S.E.2d 109 (W.Va. 1974).
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with due process requirements for civil commitments once, in the context of the justifications for continued confinement. See O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (continued confinement of a nondangerous person without
individualized treatment violates due process). Six other cases involved forced confinement
and treatment of persons charged or convicted of a crime. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972)(indefinite confinement for criminal committees); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)(incompetent to stand trial); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972)(confinement of convicted sex offender); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)(continued confinement of convicted sex offender); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966)(equal
protection treatment of persons subject to civil commitment and convicted of a crime);
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940)(due process requirements
for indefinite confinement of sex offender).
Generally, the procedures for voluntary admission for mental health treatment parallel the
provisions with respect to rights accorded involuntarily committed patients, that is, full
notice as to the possible types of treatment, and individualized treatment plans. See the
Mental Health Procedures Act, id. §§ 7201,7203,7205 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
Procedures for voluntary admission have been amended in only one major respect by the
new Act, dealing with the ability of a parent or person in loco parentis to seek admission of a
minor as a voluntar patient, thereby eliminating the need for procedural safeguards for
minors. The Act lowers the permissible age limit for such voluntary admissions from eighteen
years to fourteen. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), with
id. §§ 4402, 4403 (Purdon 1969). A federal district court has found the 1966 provisions with
respect to voluntary commitment of minors by parents violate due process by failing to
provide notice to the minor and an opportunity to oppose the commitment at a judicial hearing. See Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45
U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. May 16, 1977), noted in 15 DuQ. L. Rav. 337 (1977).
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provided for the forced confinement and treatment of the mentally
ill, lacked adequate safeguards to protect the constitutional rights
of persons alleged to be mentally ill. The Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Act of 1966 was the first comprehensive statutory
scheme attempting to deal humanely with the mentally ill in Pennsylvania.4 The purpose of the statute was plain-to place the responsibility of deciding whether the individual needed treatment for
mental illness with medical authorities.' Since the state's provision
of mental health care was designed to benefit the patient,' the legislature did not determine it necessary to require similar procedural
safeguards in the civil commitment process as were required in
criminal proceedings. This view was not entirely accurate; since
1969, four of the five provisions allowing the state to commit persons
for mental health treatment were declared unconstitutional. 7 In
addition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted the remaining provision, which authorized confinement of persons found incompetent to stand trial, 8 as subject to due process limitations
against lengthy confinement.'
4. See Comment, Hospitalizationof the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania: The Mental
Health-Mental RetardationAct of 1966, 71 DICK. L. REV. 300, 306-07 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as 1966 Comment].
5. For example, the 1966 Act authorized confinement and treatment merely on a finding
that the person was mentally disabled. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4404, 4406 (Purdon 1969).
The Act also gave wide latitude to physicians in diagnosing and treating persons by forced
confinement. See, e.g., id. § 4404.

6. The underlying rationale for this type of statute has been described as an acceptance
of the "medical model" for the determinative standard of mental illness that will justify stateenforced confinement and treatment which qualifies the illness in terms of need for treatment
rather than an objective legal standard. The elusiveness of the standard has led to its rejection
by courts. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113,1116-17 (D. Hawaii 1976). Critics of
-the medical model have argued that its acceptance by courts has resulted in needless deprivations of liberty and confinement in mental hospitals based largely on the opinions of psychiatrists as to the desirability of conformance to social norms and the need of treatment. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: "A Knife that Cuts Both Ways," 51 JUD. 370, 374
(1968). See also Wexler, TherapeuticJustice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 294 (1972).

7. United States ex rel. Souder v. Watson, 413 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Pa. 1976)(held unconstitutional § 4411's more relaxed procedure to commit prisoners as compared to civil committees); Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 45
U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. May 16, 1977) (§§ 4402 and 4403 allowing parents to voluntarily commit
children held unconstitutional); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971)
(§ 4404 provisions for commitment on certification of two physicians held unconstitutional).
See also Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976) (§ 4406 allowing for court-ordered commitment viewed
as unconstitutionally vague).
8. See notes 123-74 and accompanying text infra.
9. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 464 Pa. 499, 347 A.2d 465 (1975).
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The legislative response to these decisions was to enact the Mental Health Procedures Act. The new Act provides a more specific
and objective definition of the nature and degree of mental illness
that must be present to justify forced treatment and confinement.
Once the individual is subject to treatment, the Act sets forth his
rights and the procedures which the state must follow to assure
minimal care. Finally, the Act attempts to end both automatic and
indefinite confinements of incompetent defendants in mental institutions by imposing new procedural safeguards and placing a statutory time limit on forced treatment.' 0 The purpose of this comment
will be to examine this act and assess the probability that it will
achieve its goals of providing effective state intervention without
unduly depriving patients of their due process rights.
II.

CIVIL COMMITMENT

Pennsylvania has long recognized care of the mentally ill is a
legitimate and necessary responsibility of state government," both
for persons who have voluntarily sought treatment and for those who
have not. Coercive treatment was initially limited to institutionalization of those persons demonstrably dangerous to others," but
it was gradually extended to persons needing treatment solely to
3
prevent harm to themselves.'
Confinement of mentally ill persons dangerous to others has been
justified as an exercise of the state's police power," while confinement of the mentally ill who were simply unable to care for themselves was based on the parens patriae power. 5 A mere finding of
10. The terms "involuntary civil commitment" and "civil commitment" are used in this
comment to refer to any type of state-enforced hospitalization or treatment, whether outpatient treatment is ordered in a local mental health clinic or total hospitalization is ordered.
The Mental Health Procedures Act generally provides for three classes of mental patients:
those who voluntarily seek treatment; those mentally ill, but not charged with or convicted
of a crime; and those either charged with or convicted of a crime. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§
7201-7207, 7301-7306, 7401-7406 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
11. See 1966 Comment, supra note 4, at 304.

12.

See A. DEUTCH,

THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA

419-20 (2d ed. 1949) [hereinafter cited

as DEUTrcH].
13. Id. at 422-23.
14. See Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L.
REv. 1190, 1195 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
15. This interest has generally been expressed in civil commitment statutes in terms of
mentally ill persons "in need of care and treatment." See, e.g., The Mental Health-Mental
Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4404, 4406 (Purdon 1969). Confinement of the
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mental illness, however, has often been sufficient to justify the exercise of either power on the theory that mental illness alone is evidence of both a potential for harm"6 and the inability of the person
to seek needed treatment.' Because the state was attempting to act
in the person's best interest when it sought to confine the mentally
ill, procedural safeguards in the commitment process were regarded
as unnecessary.'" However, it has been increasingly recognized that
confinement in a mental institution results in serious deprivations
of liberty." Once an individual is classified as mentally ill, he suffers
social stigmatization which causes the individual to have difficulties
re-establishing family, social, and employment relationships when
he is released from confinement. These practical consequences of
forced confinement led courts to conclude that the mentally ill had
significant interests in opposing confinement which deserved due
process protection,"0 and which justified requiring the state to show
a substantial interest in confinement and forced treatment.'
mentally ill under the parenspatriae power is of relatively recent origin in the overall history
of state care for the mentally ill; it was first recognized in the United States in In re Josiah
Oakes, 8 Law Rep. 123 (Mass. 1845) (state court authorized commitment of a man for the
unorthodox behavior of becoming engaged to a woman of unsavory character shortly after his
wife's death). See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MErLr Dis.Aum AND THE LAW 7 (S.
Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971); Developments, supra note 14, at 1195.
Most statutes allow the exercise of the power where it is determined that the individual
lacks the capacity to evaluate whether he needs treatment. However, the legal sufficiency of
capacity has been frequently confused by the courts and examining psychiatrists who assume
the presence of mental illness means an incapacity to choose.-See Developments, supra note
14, at 1212-14. But see Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985
(1971) (while mentally ill, person still had sufficient legal capacity to refuse treatment).
16. See Projects, Civil Commitment of the Mentally III, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 822, 827
(1967).
17. Comment, Commitment and Release Standardsand Procedures: Uniform Treatment
41 U. Cm. L. Rav. 825, 827 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Uniform
for the Mentally Ill,
Treatment].
18. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 211 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 352, 236 A.2d 558, 559 (1967).
19. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). "There can no longer be any
doubt that the nature of the interests when a person . . .[is] involuntarily committed...
is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty and property' language of the fourteenth
amendment." Id. at 655, quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Persons confined in a mental hospital suffer significant deprivations of personal liberties-the freedom to move about, both within and outside the institution, the freedom to
order their daily lives, to choose their activities and associates, or even the clothes they may
wear. Even where outpatient care is ordered, the patient's freedom of movement is restricted
in the same way as a criminal parolee and his right of privacy is also infringed. Developments,
supra note 14, at 1193.
20. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
21. See, e.g., Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard v.
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A purpose of the new Procedures Act is to provide a statutory
scheme for civil commitment that will reconcile the state's interests
in preventing potential harm and treating mental illness and the
individual's interest in maintaining his liberty. It attempts to
achieve this goal by objectively defining the standard of mental
illness and conduct demonstrating such illness, by providing additional procedural safeguards, and by guaranteeing a right to treatment.
A.

Definition of Mental Illness

The statutory definition of mental illness is important because its
satisfaction is a condition of state intervention; it serves to set forth
the nature of the condition the state seeks to treat and to delineate
the conduct demonstrating the existence of that condition. The 1966
Act defined illness warranting state intervention as "mental illness
sufficient for a need of care. ' 2 The Procedures Act narrows this
standard and requires that the person be "severely mentally disabled" before commitment is justified. The Procedures Act also
imposes a stricter standard for conduct sufficient to manifest a condition requiring commitment. Traditionally, "conduct evidencing
mental illness and a need for treatment" has been the generalized
standard employed by the state.2 The Procedures Act requires instead that committing judges find a "clear and present danger" of
serious bodily harm25 demonstrated by a recent overt act." In cases
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on othergrounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
California was the first state to redraft its commitment statutes in response to court decisions. The California statute, in contrast to the Pennsylvania scheme, provides civil commitment for two classes of people: those gravely disabled and unable to care for themselves, and
those found incompetent to stand trial who are charged with a violent felony involving death,
serious bodily harm or the threat of such harm to another. See CAL. WLY. & INST. CODE §
5008 (West Supp. 1976). See also, Parker, California's New Scheme for the Commitment of
Individuals Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 6 PAc. L.J. 484, 492-501 (1975). A majority
of states, however, still allow forced treatment and confinement solely on a finding of mental
illness. Developments, supra note 14, at 1205.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1101-1102 (Purdon 1969).
23. Id. § 7301(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
24. See, e.g., id. §§ 4404, 4406 (Purdon 1969).
25. Id. § 7304 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Clear and present danger is shown by establishing that harmful conduct occurred within the preceding thirty days. Id. § 7301(b). The
statute, therefore, appears to combine the medical and legal models since medical opinion
will be required in any commitment to guage the likelihood of the conduct being repeated.
Commentators who have examined psychiatric research on dangerousness have found this
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of harm to others, the dangerous act must either result in or
threaten serious bodily harm.Y Harm to self must be manifested by
a recent suicide attempt or by self-mutilation.2 The only exception
to the requirement of a showing of dangerousness by a recent overt
act is if there is a continuing debilitating condition that renders the
individual so unable to care for himself that serious bodily harm will
result if he is not treated . 2 In addition to evidence of past dangerous
conduct, the court must also find that because of the mental disability there is a substantial probability that such conduct will be repeated.30
The requirement that dangerousness to a person is necessary to
justify forced confinement substantially expands the protection provided the individual by Dixon v. Attorney General,"'which held
32
that only a general showing of dangerousness need be established.
Under this standard, any threatened harm, whether minor or directed only against property, was sufficient to invoke the provisions
of the 1966 Act.3 The new requirement militates against confineapparent continued reliance on psychiatric predictions a serious flaw based largely on the
tendency of psychiatrists to over-predict dangerousness and over-diagnose mental illness,
and, in turn, have advocated more definite legal standards and less reliance on psychiatrists'
opinions. See Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Predictions About
Dangerousness, 23 J. LEGAL EDUC. 24, 46-47 (1971); Diamond, The PsychiatricPredictionof
Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 439 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Diamond]; Livermore,
Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 83
(1968); Shah, Some Interactionsof the Law of Mental Health in Handling Social Deviance,
23 CATH. U.L. REv. 674, 681 (1974); Developments, supra note 14, at 1241-44. One study of
mental patients showed psychiatrists tended to over-predict by a factor of at least ten times
the actual incidence of dangerous behavior. See Diamond, supra at 447. For this reason,
Diamond argues psychiatrists should testify only as to whether the actual conduct was the
result of mental illness and whether medical treatment would help. Id. at 452. Another
study demonstrated that non-mentally ill persons who were admitted to mental hospitals
were not recognized by the hospital staff as not mentally ill for a control period of two weeks.
See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 379, 385 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenhan].
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(b)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
27. Id.§ 7301(b)(2).
28. Id. § 7301(b)(2)(i).
29. Id. § 7301(b)(1).
30. Id.§ 7301(a).
31. 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Dixon expanded the protection provided by the
1966 Act and is regarded as the seminal case in the area.
32. Id. at 974.
33. It has been noted that families who want to abandon senile or bothersome relatives
frequently abuse such statutory provisions. See, e.g., Valley News Dispatch (Tarentum, Pa.),
March 19, 1977, at A-2, col. 3, detailing a study made by the Center for the Analysis of Public
Issues, where it was noted procedures for temporary commitments on the approval of a
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ment or forced treatment for relatively harmless but offensive conduct. While more precise, the statutory definition still places unjustified reliance on predictions or psychiatric opinions" about the
probability of future harm. Not only does the Procedures Act suggest psychiatrists must express opinions about the existence of mental illness, but the Act's requirement of finding a probability of
future dangerous conduct compels psychiatric opinions on that issue
as well. Although such predictive ability was apparently taken for
granted by the drafters of the Procedures Act, there may not be a
substantial scientific basis for such an assumption: a study of 1,000
patients diagnosed as dangerous showed the accuracy of psychiatric
predictions was less than that achieved by random choice.35 Thus,
a decision that civil commitment is necessary is largely based on the
questionable assumption that mental illness or the probability of
future dangerous conduct can be accurately diagnosed." The tendency of psychiatrists to over-predict dangerousness and overdiagnose mental illness37 may be restrained by the requirement that
physician were the most frequently abused. Police, faced with complaints by one family
member against another, often refer the latter to a mental facility, with the result that he is
labelled mentally ill; also, in the past, law enforcement officers who wanted to remove an

individual who was acting strangely did not have to wait until he had committed a criminal
act before confining him to a mental institution. See 1966 Comment, supra note 4, at 423.
34. The Act does require that the report to the court on mental condition be in terms
understandable to laymen. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7303(c)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
But see id. § 7402(e)(4), which contains no similar requirements for the report in a hearing
to determine competency to stand trial. See note 25 supra for discussion of the unreliability
of psychiatric opinions.
35. B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 73 (1973). See also Developments, supra note 14, at 1301.
36. Diagnosis of mental illness has been particularly subject to over-inclusiveness by
medical authorities. See Rosenhan, supra note 25, at 384-86. In addition, medical authorities
apparently agree on two factors: first, that an uncooperative patient cannot benefit from
therapy, see Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L.
REv. 755, 768-69 (1969); and second, even given the patient's cooperation, there are some
mental illnesses that are untreatable in the sense that there is no known successful form of
treatment, see Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REv. 936,
941-48 (1974).
37. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 440-44. The author notes: "I know of no reports in
the scientific literature which are supported by valid clinical experience and statistical evidence that can describe psychological or physical signs or symptoms which can be reliably
used to discriminate between the potentially dangerous and the harmless individual." Id. at
444.
An alternative to requiring a showing of substantial and serious physical harm where the
state is seeking to confine under the parens patriae power would be to require a showing of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person needed assistance. See Developments, supra
note 14, at 1301.
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a recent overt act must have occurred; however, it should be specified that the psychiatric diagnosis be limited to explaining how the
overt act demonstrates the existence8 of mental illness or the proba3
bility of future dangerous conduct.

B. Emergency and Long-Term Commitment
To prevent needless confinements, the Procedures Act requires
that prior to any type of forced treatment, medical authorities and
judicial officers must establish that the person is mentally ill and
dangerous. The new Act essentially develops provisions in the 1966
Act which provided for two general types of treatment-emergency
and long-term care-but were silent about the commitment procedures to be followed under either category.
1. Emergency Detention
Short-term temporary confinement, characterized as emergency
detention, is appropriate when the person, without warning, exhibits violent, erratic behavior indicating a sudden mental imbalance.
While his conduct might normally subject him to arrest and criminal charges, the apparent existence of a severe mental disturbance
causes recognition that treatment is more appropriate than incarceration.
Emergency detention, the broadest exercise of the state's powers
with regard to the mentally ill, is designed to deal with these crisis
situations and to avoid the inappropriate use of criminal sanctions.
The Procedures Act limits procedural prerequisites in this situation
to a minimum, and authorizes the county mental health administrator to approve the issuance of a warrant for the person's detention
upon application by a physician or other responsible party, which
sets forth facts tending to show the person is dangerous and needs
treatment. 31 Furthermore, a person may be placed in custody without a warrant by any police officer, physician, or mental health
authority who personally observes the individual acting in a bizarre
and dangerous manner. 0 After the individual is taken to a mental
health facility, he must be examined by a physician within two
hours to determine whether he is mentally ill within the statutory
38.
39.
40.

Diamond, supra note 25, at 440-44.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7302(a)(1)(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
Id. § 7302(a)(2).
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requirement of "clear and present danger."" Treatment may be
started immediately if he is found to be mentally ill; if not, he must
be immediately discharged.42 If the person is detained, mental
health authorities are required to tell the person why he is being
detained and inform him of his right to use the telephone or to have
someone notified of his hospitalization. 3 A seventy-two hour time
limit is imposed on emergency detention." If continued treatment
is not necessary, the patient must be released prior to the expiration
of the seventy-two hour limit. 5 If further treatment is necessary, the
patient may agree to voluntary treatment, or he may be detained
for extended emergency treatment."
Extended treatment is limited to a maximum of twenty days and
requires the certification of a judge or mental health review officer' 7
who must find that the person is severely mentally disabled and in
need of such treatment. 48 Certification possesses some due process
protection since it is made after conducting an informal hearing at
which the person has the right to be represented by counsel and to
examine witnesses and present evidence in his own behalf; a full
record of the proceedings is required." In addition, where the certification is made by a mental health review officer, the patient may
appeal the decision in common pleas court. 0
The more relaxed procedural safeguards pertaining to seventytwo hour emergency treatment were partly justified by the rationale
that dangerous conduct was required to trigger the application of
the statute. The provision was regarded as one of the more laudatory
aspects of the 1966 statute in that it provided an alternative to the
arrest and jailing of a person on a criminal charge. 5' The Procedures
41. Id. § 7302(b).
42. Id.
43. Id.§ 7302(c).
44. Id.§ 7302(d).
45. Id. § 7303.
46. Id. §§ 7303(b), (c). The provisions create a new subdivision of emergency detention.
47. The Act provides that such officers may be appointed by the county court of common
pleas for a period of one year; they must be members of the bar of the state supreme court.
See id. § 7109.
48. Id. § 7303(c)(1).
49. Id.
50. Id.§ 7303(g).
51. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1125 (D. Hawaii 1976); Commonwealth
ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 190, 339 A.2d 764, 782 (1975), appeal dismissed,
424 U.S. 960 (1976). The relaxation of procedural safeguards in such cases on the theory that
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Act continues this policy by granting mental health authorities the
sole discretion to decide whether to confine a person for treatment,
but shortens the maximum time of detention from ten to three days.
The 1976 Act's treatment of this type of emergency detention, however, remains somewhat deficient since it fails to provide a prior
hearing before a neutral judicial officer at which a person can challenge the three-day confinement." This criticism is made more compelling by the fact that the legislature has made no distinction
between the degree of mental disability or the type of dangerousness
justifying emergency as opposed to court-ordered confinement.
Thus, whether a person will be afforded the greater safeguards involved in court-ordered treatment or will be detained under the
more informal procedures of the emergency provisions remains
largely within the discretion of the mental health authorities. Similarly, while the hearing for extended emergency treatment provides
additional due process protection, notably the right to counsel and
appeal under some circumstances, major rights of patients are not
fully protected since, given the limited time, the ability to prepare
the individual benefits from treatment has been criticized on the ground that the treatment
is essentially a behavior control method designed to produce social conformance, an exaction
that would not be made in the case of a person tried and punished for a criminal offense.
See Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 291-92 (1972). A response to that
argument is that a short period of confinement to determine whether the person is seriously
mentally ill is a minor deprivation of liberty compared to the more serious consequences that
may flow from a failure to intervene, either in terms of serious bodily harm, or a resulting
criminal charge. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra at 1126; Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp.,
384 F. Supp. 1085, 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1974). See also Developments, supra note 14, at 126566.
52. Provisions in criminal statutes requiring a preliminary hearing to determine whether
there is probable cause to detain have been used as a rationale for requiring a similar preliminary hearing in emergency commitments. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala.
1974) (probable cause hearing must be held as soon as possible after emergency commitment
begins); Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085,1098 (E.D. Mich. 1974)(preliminary hearing is needed to determine probable cause which must be followed by full hearing
within reasonable time after a complete diagnosis has been made). It has also been suggested
that even if a probable cause hearing need not be held in all cases, it should still be available
to the individual who wishes to challenge a physician's judgment. See Comment, The Gates
of Cerberus, Involuntary Civil Commitment in Philadelphia,49 TEMP. L.Q. 323, 337-39 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Commitment in Philadelphia].There it was noted that applications
for emergency commitment are routinely approved by telephone conversations with the petitioning party, generally either a family member or a police officer; the psychiatrist is thus
given virtually unfettered discretion in determining who is in need of treatment. See also
ANNUAL PLAN OF THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION PROGRAM

66 (1976) (telephone authorizations for emergency commitment are also established procedure in Allegheny County).
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a defense or to have adequate assistance of counsel is greatly restricted. 3 Hearings may, in a sense, be pro-forma.
2.

Court-Ordered Treatment

A judicial determination of mental illness and potential harm is
required for the second major category of civil commitment-courtordered involuntary treatment. Since confinement under the 1966
Act was based on "need of care," court-ordered commitment continued indefinitely until the person no longer needed treatment."
Under the Procedures Act, the order is effective only for a ninetyday period.5 5 Because court-ordered treatment is lengthy in duration
the legislature provided more detailed procedural safeguards in the
initial commitment proceeding than for emergency treatment, and
enacted provisions to prevent needless and continued hospitalization.
The method of initiating proceedings under the Procedures Act
depends on whether the person is already in custody. Where the
person is already confined for emergency treatment, the proceedings
are initiated by the county mental health administrator, who must
file a petition with the common pleas court" which states reasonable
grounds to support a conclusion that the person is dangerously mentally ill.51 A copy of the petition must be given to the person along
with an explanation of the proceedings. 8 A hearing on the petition
must be held within five days. 59 Where the person is not in custody,
"any reasonable party" may file a petition with the court, which
must then independently determine whether probable cause is
shown on the face of the petition to warrant a hearing.10 No definite
time limit is set for the hearing as is provided when the person is
53. For example, the Act does not specify what standard of proof should be used in
determining the need for continued treatment and does not give the person the right to have
his own mental health expert testify on his behalf. See The Mental Health Procedures Act,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7303(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See also notes 73-102 and accompanying text infra, which discuss procedures applicable in court-ordered commitments.
54. The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4418 (Purdon
1969).
55. The Mental Health Procedures Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304 (Purdon Supp. 19771978).

56. Id.§ 7304(b).
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.§ 7304(b)(2).
Id.§ 7304(b)(3).
Id.§ 7304(b)(4).
Id.§ 7304(c).
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already in custody." This difference in the two sections presents
potential problems of unfairness. 2 A person not in custody may
have substantially more time to prepare a defense against confinement than a person in custody who has only five days to prepare
such a defense. This discrepancy might be justified given the fact
that the person in custody has at least previously exhibited conduct
indicating dangerousness, but since this finding is somewhat discretionary it would seem that permitting a pre-hearing release and
additional time to prepare a defense would be more consonant with
the Act's general objective of limiting the number of needless confinements. Aside from these differences, however, the procedural
safeguards examined below apply to all court-ordered commitments, whether the person is already in custody or not.
a. ProceduralSafeguards
Despite the fact that coercive treatment and lengthy confinement
often result in deprivations of liberty, 3 relaxed procedures in the
pre-hospitalization stage were permitted by the 1966 Act because
the state was attempting to avoid imposing the stigma of a criminal
charge on the mentally ill." However, courts have declared that the
mere characterization of a proceeding as civil does not remove the
requirement of procedural due process. 5 As the deprivation of liberty resulting from civil commitment became more apparent, and
as dangerousness developed as the basis for involuntary treatment,
commitment hearings were increasingly compared to criminal proceedings." Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to
consider the due process limitations in pre-commitment procedures, 7 its decisions in other contexts indicate safeguards identical
to those required in criminal proceedings are not necessary if the
commitment procedures ensure fairness and accuracy in the fact61. The court is required only to set a date for a hearing as soon as is practical. Id. §
7304(c)(3).
62. There is also a contradiction in the Act since an emergency patient may be released
after three days and not be "in custody" when a hearing is held pursuant to the five-day
requirement. Compare id. § 7302(d), with id. § 7304(b)(4).
63. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1286-87.
64. See Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super Ct. 155, 190, 339 A.2d 764,
782 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976) (Van der Voort, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 171, 339 A.2d at 772.
66. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
67. See cases cited at note 3 supra.
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finding process."8 Lower courts faced with a due process challenge
to commitment proceedifigs have responded diversely, some requiring safeguards identical to those in criminal proceedings,"9 and others permitting more relaxed procedures in civil commitments. 0 In
according mentally ill persons due process protection and rights, the
Procedures Act establishes safeguards in excess of those required by
Dixon, but less than those required in criminal proceedings. 7
1. Notice
Effective notice is critical because the nature and degree of notice
may well determine whether the individual is able to exercise other
procedural rights. The Procedures Act recognizes the necessity of
notice even in those circumstances where bodily harm is threatened
and requires that the individual receive at least three days prior to
the hearing a summons and the petition seeking commitment, the
names of any adverse witnesses, medical opinions concerning his
mental condition, and the name of court-appointed counsel.72 Although the three-day minimum period may raise questions of adequacy in regard to the time needed to prepare a defense, other
provisions may obviate the potential for unfairness. A person already in custody has constructive notice resulting from the emergency commitment. Thus, only a person not in custody would be
truly surprised by the petition. As was indicated earlier, under those
circumstances, the hearing need not be held within a specified time.
68. Compare McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1972) (jury trial in juvenile proceedings not essential to fact-finding process), with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1971) (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required to convict in juvenile cases). See also Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (compelling state interest in deportation
proceedings lessened the necessity for proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
69. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
70. Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Commonwealth ex
rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 174-75, 339 A.2d 764, 773-74 (1975), appeal
dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
71. The specific procedural rights accorded in the Procedures Act are substantially similar
to those provided by the court in Dixon. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7304(e), (f)
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), with Dixon v. Attorney Gen. 325 F. Supp. 966, 972-74 (M.D. Pa.
1971). The most critical difference in safeguards provided criminal defendants and the mentally ill is in the burden of proof. See notes 88-102 and accompanying text infra.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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Assistance of Counsel

The right to court-appointed counsel,7 3 which Dixon found implicit in the court-ordered commitment provisions of the 1966 Act,7
has been expressly provided in the Procedures Act.75 The Procedures
Act also allows the defendant to have counsel present during any
court-ordered psychiatric interview." Furthermore, he has the right
to employ his own mental health expert to assist in his defense and
to testify on his behalf."
The provisions for technical assistance show a strong legislative
concern that the person have roughly the same type of expertise
available as the state. This reduces the danger that the court will
hear only expert evidence presenting the state's view of the person's
mental condition. The provision permitting counsel to be present
during the psychiatric examination, however, creates the potential
that the examination will turn into an adversary proceeding. In
addition, presence of counsel puts the psychiatric examination itself
in a different light for both the psychiatrist and his patient. Confidentiality and the establishment of a doctor-patient relationship,
considered crucial to an accurate diagnosis, would be difficult in the
presence of a third party. Thus, the provision seems destined to
result in wasted time for court-appointed psychiatrists. Since the
73. The right to counsel has been recognized as a fundamental right in criminal proceedings. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (right to counsel in minor criminal
offenses); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1961) (right as applied to juvenile proceedings).
74. 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Courts were influenced by studies which
showed that where a person has been represented by counsel he has a better than one hundred
percent chance of not being convicted. Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process, 25 RtrrGnEs L. REv. 405, 438 (1971). See, e.g., Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
76. Id. § 7304(c)(5). In fashioning procedural safeguards for the psychiatric interview,
proposals have ranged from requiring that the person be warned of his right to be silent or to
not participate in any tests, the right to refuse to participate at all, or the right to have counsel
present during the interview. Denial of the right to have counsel present at the interview has
been rationalized on the theory that counsel's presence would unnecessarily impinge on the
confidential nature of the doctor-patient relationship. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1098-99 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974). See
generally Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric
Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L. REv. 648
(1970).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). If the person cannot afford
such a specialist, the Act also allows the court to provide a reasonable fee for such purpose.
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person can in fact refuse to answer unwanted questions or participate in testing, a more efficient means of reaching the same result
would be to allow the patient to refuse the examination initially. 8
3.

Hearing

During the pre-commitment hearing, the Procedures Act expressly provides four specific safeguards: the right to the assistance
of counsel and an expert of the person's choice; the right to remain
silent; the right to confront and examine witnesses and present
evidence; and the right to choose a public or a private proceeding. 9
These rights provide substantial protection to persons facing confinement. However, the right to be present, the application of the
customary rules of evidence, and the right to a jury trial-rights
normally accorded criminal defendants-are not expressly provided.
The right to appear at trial is a constitutional right; 0 in the past,
however, the fear of unnecessarily upsetting the individual and aggravating his condition led courts to excuse the requirement of presence at a commitment hearing." Although not explicitly, the Procedures Act conversely appears to provide the person with the right
to be present at the commitment hearing. 2 Recognition of the right
is preferable since, practically, determining that a person is so mentally ill that he cannot be present seems to presuppose the result of
the proceeding. 3 Moreover, there is an increasing tendency by
78. Although perhaps not as detailed, an expert opinion could be developed from observation of the person's conduct at the hearing and by hypothetical questions concerning the
presence of mental illness based on alleged dangerous conduct.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(e) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantee is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
81. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
82. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7304(c)(4), (e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See also
id. § 7303(b) (informal hearing held at a mental health facility where emergency extension is
sought); id. § 7304(e)(6) (court-ordered hearings may be held at locations other than the
courthouse when it would be in the best interest of the person to do so).
A number of statutes provide for hearings to be held in an institution where the individual
is confined, a concession to mental health experts who have consistently argued that to
provide the mentally ill person with the full panoply of procedural safeguards, including a
formal hearing in a courthouse, unduly traumatizes the patient with excessive and unnecessary legal formalisms. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1274; Commitment in Philadelphia, supra note 52, at 432.
83. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1130 (D. Hawaii 1976); Lessard v.
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courts to view presence at a hearing as a fundamental right."4
In contrast, strict adherence to the hearsay rules and the right to
a jury is not as compelling. The courts have found that rather than
constituting fundamental rights, these procedural safeguards are
designed to promote the accuracy of the fact-finding process. 8s Rules
governing the admission of evidence, however, particularly those
excluding hearsay, go directly to the inherent reliability of the evidence; hence, the accuracy of a finding of mental illness and fairness
of the proceeding are enhanced by adherence to the hearsay rules.86
Most courts have not reached the same conclusion regarding jury
trials; they have analogized commitment to juvenile proceedings
and have concluded that a jury does not enhance the fact-finding
process and is not an essential element of due process. 7 It is suggested that if fairness to the person is the primary consideration in
deciding whether to require a certain procedure, courts should apply
the hearsay rules, at least where the hearsay lacks sufficient indicia
of reliability. Regarding jury trials, if the need to apply a jury's
common-sense notions appears slight compared to the danger of a
jury commiting a person who was merely acting in a way that is
embarrassing to others or simply undesirable, then reliance on the
conclusion of a judge may be preferable. It would be appropriate for
the legislature to examine the feasibility of applying the rules of
evidence and requiring a jury trial in these proceedings.
4.

Burden of Proof

Once a hearing has been held, the judge or mental health review
officer must determine whether the person is severely mentally disabled and subject to forced treatment. Of the three standards of
proof developed for use in judicial proceedings, preponderance of
the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Procedures Act adopts the clear and convincSchmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1092 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
114 U.S. 473 (1974).
84. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967) (due process in further commitment
proceedings required defendant be present with counsel).
85. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
86. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1102 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234
Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 174, 339 A.2d 764, 774 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976). See
also note 157 infra.
87. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1128 (D. Hawaii 1976).
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ing evidence standard."
This choice is open to criticism since courts and commentators
comparing commitment to criminal proceedings have strongly advocated imposing the stricter reasonable doubt standard 9 which is
constitutionally required in criminal proceedings. 0 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has applied the reasonable doubt standard to juvenile proceedings in In re Winship,91 on the theory that juveniles
suffer deprivations of liberty and stigmatization comparable to
those endured by criminal defendants. Some lower federal courts
have similarly held the reasonable doubt standard to be proper in
commitment proceedings, reasoning that if the highest standard is
a necessary constitutional element where a crime has occurred,
there is an even greater necessity for its application where confinement is sought solely to prevent harm." Other courts have adopted
the risk allocation analysis articulated in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in In re Winship: the comparative social costs of a
possible error should determine the acceptable standard. 3
The risk-allocating method of determining the standard of proof
focuses on who has the greater interest in the outcome of the proceedings and would be likely to suffer the greater harm by an erroneous decision. Thus, where deprivation of liberty is not as great as
in criminal proceedings and the state has countervailing interests of
equal weight, courts have found due process requirements satisfied
by a standard of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence." 4
When civil commitment is subjected to a risk-allocating analysis
the clear and convincing standard seems inadequate. The loss of
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The standard was held as
constitutionally required in Dixon v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
89. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 649-50 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349
F. Supp. 1078, 1093-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974); Developments, supra note 14, at 1298-1300.
90. Prior to its consideration of due process rights of juveniles, the Supreme Court had
never explicitly stated that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in criminal proceedings. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970); Developments, supra note 14, at 1295.
91. 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
92. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 653-54 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1094-95 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
93. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring), was relied on in Dixon
v. Attorney Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
94. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) (deportation proceeding). The standard was viewed as acceptable to meet due process requirements
in civil commitments in Pennsylvania. Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super
Ct. 155, 174-75, 339 A.2d 764, 774 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
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liberty and stigmatization to the individual caused by commitment
are certainly as great as the potential deprivations to juveniles
charged with a crime, while the state interest in providing treatment
is roughly equivalent. 5 In addition, the inability of psychiatrists to
predict dangerousness with consistent accuracy suggests the state
interest may not be as great as the individual's interest in remaining
free."
Although the evidentiary standard of the Procedures Act appears
inadequate to guard against an erroneous factual finding, it may be
argued that other, supplementary provisions of the Act support its
use, 97 notably those which curtail the length of commitment and
which clearly indicate that confinement is not to be viewed as the
primary treatment tool. Yet the threshold question of the severity
of mental illness sufficient to justify state intervention-serious
bodily harm and the potential for its recurrence-does not depend
upon these ancillary considerations. The statute sets a standard by
which the state must justify imposing its notions of social normalcy
upon the individual through treatment by requiring evidence of
conduct which would justify criminal proceedings absent the presence of mental illness. 8 That the state is treating the individual, not
punishing him, is irrelevant to the standard of proof; the state's
characterization of the nature of confinement is unimportant where
there are substantial deprivations of liberty. Moreover, it can be
argued that the difficulties of proving conduct manifesting mental
illness would not be aggravated by the reasonable doubt standard.
Indeed, since psychiatrists would be required to justify their predictions more persuasively in order to satisfy a higher- standard of
proof, the accuracy of the fact-finding process may be assured by
95. Developments, supra note 14, at 1298-1300.
96. Id.
97. For example, certain safeguards against unnecessary confinement also make it more
probable that an error will be quickly recognized and corrected. Before any treatment can be
ordered, the patient's personal circumstances, the availability of community resources, family, and employment possibilities must be considered. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f)
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Also, treatment itself can only be ordered for a specific time, the
patient's condition is required to be re-evaluated monthly, and he must be released when he
no longer poses a serious threat of harm. Id. §§ 7108(a),(b).
98. The meaning of "clear and present danger," implies that with the exception of harm
to self, the dangerous conduct of the person would constitute a crime. See PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 7301(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
99. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1301-03.
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increasing the reliability of those predictions. 00 An examination of
the statutory scheme, particularly those provisions regarding persons subject to criminal prosecution,' 0 ' supports the conclusion that
the equal protection and due process clauses require that the burden
of proof in civil commitments be beyond a reasonable doubt.0 2
b.

Rights of Persons Subject to Treatment

Once it has been determined that the individual is severely mentally disabled, a court must determine the kind of treatment it
should order. Prior to the 1966 Act, institutionalization was the
usual answer. The 1966 Act established community centers 0 3 and
authorized a committing court to consider partial hospitalization'0 4
as another form of treatment. This alternative treatment is promoted by the Procedures Act which mandates that "in every case,
the least restrictions consistent with adequate treatment shall be
employed."' 05
100. See note 25 and accompanying text supra regarding the accuracy of psychiatric
opinions on future dangerous conduct.
101. See notes 135-78 and accompanying text infra.
102. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (procedural safeguards
must be afforded all mental patients including those who had been convicted of a crime);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (due process and equal protection requirements
prohibit indefinite commitment of incompetent defendants); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972) (equal protection guarantees extend to criminal mental patients); Baxstrom v.
Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (equal protection guarantees require the same procedural safeguards for all mental patients, criminal and noncriminal). See also Developments, supra note
14, at 1295-1303.
103. The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, § 4301 (Purdon
1969).
104. The Act of 1966 allowed a committing court to consider partial hospitalization, but
the provision was permissive rather than mandatory. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406(b)
(Purdon 1969). Most mental health experts now believe patients respond best (and are given
the best chance for cure) if they remain in their community and continue with their jobs,
home life and personal relationships. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: PracticalGuides and ConstitutionalImperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108, 1113
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Chambers]. Some of the intractable obstacles to successful
treatment are that hospitals are often too far away from the patients' communities, are
understaffed and overcrowded, and lack enough psychiatrists and other professional personnel. Id. at 1125. Even if the hospital is adequate, the isolation of patients in an institution
may create in long-term patients symptoms of withdrawal, muteness, and loss of motivation.
Id. at 1125-27. See also Rosenhan, supra note 25, at 398.
105. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The least restrictive type
of confinement was first espoused by federal courts as a requirement of due process, on the
reasoning that since the ultimate goal of treatment is nearly always to enable the individual
to function in an unrestricted environment, the patient should be given as much opportunity
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The kind of treatment which the state must provide has also been
more specifically delineated under the Procedures Act. An entirely
new section defines what constitutes adequate treatment. Limited
in part to the basic essentials "necessary to maintain decent, safe
and healthful living conditions,' '0 an express right to diagnosis and
treatment is accorded.' The right is implemented by a requirement
that mental health authorities develop, with the cooperation and
consent of the patient, an individualized treatment plan.0 8 The plan
must be reevaluated for each patient every thirty days by a staff
treatment team'09 and a determination must be made whether to
continue treatment, develop a new plan, or discharge the person." 0
The provisions for individualized treatment appear to be aimed
at complying with language in the Supreme Court's decision in
O'Connorv. Donaldson," which upheld a private cause of action for
the confinement of a non-dangerous person in a state mental hospias possible to function in controlled experiments with freedom. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d
617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969), citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (where fundamental and personal liberties are involved, the government may not use broad means to accomplish an otherwise legitimate state goal if the ends can be more narrowly achieved).
Although the provisions of the Procedures Act provide much needed guidance to those
responsible for commitment in Pennsylvania, the practical effects may be questioned. Noting
the reliance of judges on the conclusions of psychiatrists and medical experts, commentators
have concluded that once a patient enters the domain of a psychiatrist responsible for commitment, the recommendation for hospitalization is virtually automatic. See Commitment
in Philadelphia, supra note 52, at 335. Such reliance was empirically shown in statistics
concerning civil commitments in Allegheny County in 1970: outpatient care was authorized
in only three of one thousand cases. ANNUAL PLAN OF THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH
AND MENTAL RETARDATION PROGRAM

66 (1971). It has been suggested that the key to providing

less restrictive treatment may not be in statutory provisions so much as in giving judges a
fundamental understanding of the serious dangers of hospitalization.. Chambers, supra note
104, at 1125.
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7104 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 7107.
109. Id. 99 7106, 7108(a).
110. Id. § 7108(b). While specific provisions for an individualized treatment plan, recordkeeping and review, id. § 7108(c), and reevaluation may seem an excessive amount of paperwork, the records serve a two-fold purpose. It has been observed:
By articulating a plan of treatment and by explaining the basis for important decisions affecting the patient, they (hospital administrators) would fully inform the court
at a glance. . . [Tlhey would also enhance the integrity, reliability, and thoroughness of the hospital's own decision-making procedures .... Besides, such paperwork
is often bothersome precisely because [it] . . .forces busy administrators to confront
problems and considerations their intuitive reactions might have overlooked.
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
111. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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tal."12 The Court rejected the argument that mere custodial care is
justified as "milieu therapy,"1 3 therapy by reason of the hospital
setting, and held such care constitutionally infirm because it failed
to provide a plan aimed at treatment of the individual."' The
Court's holding in Donaldson and the provisions of the Procedures
Act place a substantially greater burden on the professional staffs
of mental health facilities. Whereas a treatment plan is necessary
to deal with the inherent problems of institutionalization,"' if it is
112. Id. at 576-77.
113. Id. at 573-75. The Court, however, did not disapprove of such custodial care in all
cases. See id. at 578 n.2 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
114. Id. at 573-75. Although the Supreme Court in Donaldson specifically refused to
decide whether there is a constitutional right to treatment, the Court held it is a denial of
due process to confine an individual without a treatment plan aimed at meeting his needs.
Id. at 573.
Conditions in state mental hospitals, absent a statutory provision for a "right to treatment"
for mental patients, have been attacked in federal courts as violative of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process where there is a failure to provide minimum levels of care and
safe facilities. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1310-12 (5th Cir. 1974) (constitutional right to treatment included adequate professional staff); New York Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (minimum safe, custodial care
is an element of due process.) See generally Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Rights of
Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1282 (1973);
Debate: The Right to Treatment, Encounter and Synthesis, 10 DuQ. L. REv. 554 (1973). But
see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 588-89 (1975)(Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that
many types of mental illness are currently diagnosed as untreatable by medical authorities);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1087 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
The justification for finding a constitutional right to treatment was set forth by the court
of appeals in Donaldson, where the court said: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then
fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due process." O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 493 F.2d 507, 521 (5th Cir. 1975), quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,
785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). This constitutional right, however, was premised on the indeterminate
nature of the confinement, id. at 522, which has been expressly eliminated by the Mental
Health Procedures Act. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(g)(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
The right accorded under the statute is to "adequate treatment," defined as "such accomodations, diet, heat, light, sanitary facilities, clothing, recreation, education and medical care
as are necessary to maintain decent, safe and healthful living conditions . . . diagnosis,
evaluation, therapy, or rehabilitation as needed to alleviate pain and distress and to facilitate
the recovery of the patient." Id. at § 7104.
115. It has been observed, for example, that continued hospitalization creates a psychological dependence on the institutional setting. Bentinck, A Study of Relatives' View of State
Mental Hospital Patients, 50 SOCIAL CASEWORK 519, 525 (1969); Robitscher, The Right to
Psychiatric Treatment: A Social-LegalApproach to the Plight of the State Hospital Patient,
18 VILL. L. REv. 11, 11 (1972).
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to be realistically effective, a continuing expenditure of funds is
necessary."'
III.

CRIME AND THE MENTALLY ILL

Perhaps no other issue cuts so deeply into the bases of the criminal justice system than the treatment of the mentally ill person
charged with a crime. In these circumstances, the right of the individual to obtain a fair trial and the interest of society in being
protected from the criminal are brought into sharp conflict." 7 The
1966 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act responded to this conflict by making it easier to confine the criminal defendant than the
civil commitee, and to impose longer periods"8 and more restrictive
conditions of confinement."' It is still recognized, however, that
since commitment of both groups of mentally ill persons satisfies
similar state interests, equal protection and due process require that
both groups be treated substantially the same." The Procedures
Act deals with the problem of the criminal defendant consistent
116. Studies have shown the cost of in-patient care and professional staff shortages are
the practical reasons why mental hospitals can provide only custodial care. See Wall St. J.,
Aug. 19, 1976, at 1, col. 1. The article deals with the problems of former mental patients
released in part because of the cost of in-patient care.
117. The treatment of the mentally ill person charged with a crime reflects the basic
ambivalence of society, which, on the one hand desires to protect and shelter the mentally
ill from the harshness of the criminal process, and, on the other hand, desires to protect
society and innocent persons. Janis, Incompetency Commitment: The Need for Procedural
Safeguards and a Proposed Statutory Scheme, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 720, 735 & n. 86 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Janis]. The conflict has been accentuated by extraordinary cases which
demonstrate the inability of society to effectively deal with some classes of dangerously
mentally ill persons. Such cases have been noted as part of the reason for relaxed commitment
procedures. See Diamond, supra note 25, at 439.
118. See, e.g., The Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4409
(Purdon 1969), which provides for commitment if the defendant is incompetent and charged
with any crime, regardless of how minor, for so long as the defendant is mentally ill; id. §
4410 (commitment in lieu of sentence); id. § 4411 (commitment while undergoing sentencing); id. § 4412 (permits commitment in a mental institution upon the agreement of the
Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental Health that the person in prison
is mentally ill). See also Bloomberg, A Proposalfor Community-Based Hospitals as an Alternative to a State Hospital, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 664 (J. Katz, J.
Goldstein & A. Dershowitz eds. 1967); Janis, supra note 117, at 722.
119. See generally Note, Hospitalizationof the Mentally Ill Criminals in Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 78 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hospitalization].
120. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 724 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
510-11 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 386 U.S. 107, 111 (1966). See Uniform Treatment, supra
note 17, at 831.
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with this recognition; its response will be discussed in the following
sections.
A.

Incompetency to Stand Trial

Throughout the United States, a defendant cannot be tried if he
is found incompetent to stand trial. The rule is derived from the
common law, which developed the ban because of the prohibition
against trial of a defendant in absentia, the increased risk of convicting an innocent person which exists when the defendant cannot
assist in his defense, and the belief that it is inhumane to prosecute
and punish a deranged person.' 2 ' This rationale was accepted by the
legislature, which provided that a person is incompetent to stand
trial if he is unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him or is unable to assist in his own defense.'
A finding of incompetency has usually resulted in both an absolute stay of the criminal proceedings until the defendant is considered competent, and automatic confinement of the defendant to a
mental institution. Stay of the proceedings is justified as protecting
the defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial.'23 Automatic confinement 24 has been held justified since it assertedly enables the
121. Eizenstat, Mental Incompetency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.C.L. REv. 379 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Eizenstat]; Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 832, 834 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Foote].
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See also Janis, supra note
117, at 720 & n.1, 721 & n.3. This general standard has been increasingly construed by courts
and psychiatrists alike in a broad fashion so that it has come to include greater proportions
of criminal defendants. Eizenstat, supra note 121, at 388-94. This trend has been criticized
by commentators who urge it is an unnecessary deprivation of the defendant's civil liberties.
One writer noted a study which showed that a random group of competent persons who took
the standard competency test were found incompetent by psychologists. See Brakel,
Presumption, Bias and Incompetency in the Criminal Process, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1105, 111920. See also Eizenstat, supra note 121, at 392-93.
That psychiatrists' opinions on competency and mental illness itself frequently include
value judgments and conclusions about matters unrelated to those issues was apparent in one
report which stated: "We are agreed that his limited ... educational back[ground] and his
deprived social environment may make it likely that the patient may impulsively repeat the
act for which he was originally incarcerated." Commonwealth v. Klinger, 215 Pa. Super. Ct.
505, 507-08, 258 A.2d 668, 669 (1969) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
123. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456 Pa. 313, 319, 318 A.2d 724, 727 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 205 & n.1, 255 A.2d 519, 522 & n.1 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 355, 365, 324 A.2d 483, 488-89 (1974).
124. A majority of competency statutes provide that a defendant found incompetent to
stand trial must be confined for treatment by the state until he regains his competency;
others, like Pennsylvania under the 1966 Act, authorize the hearing judge to order an alterna-
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individual to regain his competency thereby permitting the trial to
proceed, 2 ' benefits the individual by providing necessary treatment, and protects society. 2 ' These traditional reactions to a finding of incompetency have not completely survived more recent balancings of the competing interests involved, including legislative
concerns expressed in the Procedures Act.
1 1. Automatic Confinement
As suggested above, there are two distinct issues involved once a
finding of incompetency has been made: whether fairness requires
delay of the trial, and whether the defendant's mental condition
which brought about the incompetency finding would be improved
by hospitalization. Courts have rarely distinguished these separate
issues.' 27 In some situations, confinement may in fact be illogical;
the reasons for confinement may not necessarily be the same as
those necessitating delay of the trial. 121 More importantly, however,
confinement may not attain its stated purposes of treating the individual and ultimately enabling a trial to proceed. It is entirely conceivable that a severely mentally disabled person is untreatable.
Even where treatment is possible, moreover, it has been recognized
that the prognosis for recovery may be greater in an out-patient
29
facility in some circumstances than in a mental institution.
Assuming that confinement is appropriate, it has also been recognized that a severly disabled person who is committed to an institution for the criminally insane receives little more than custodial
tive form of treatment. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408 (Purdon 1969); Janis, supra note
117, at 726-28.
125. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 204, 255 A.2d 519, 521 (1969).

126. Commonwealth v. McQuaid, 464 Pa. 499, 516-17, 347 A.2d 465, 474 (1975) (treatment
used as a quid pro quo for a stay in the proceedings against the defendant); Commonwealth
v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 208, 255 A.2d 519, 523 (1969).

127.

The procedure of automatically committing the defendant to Farview State Hospital
after a sanity commission had found the defendant incompetent, but before any judicial
hearing, was tacitly approved in Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519 (1969).
128. See Janis, supra note 117, at 723; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L.
REv. 454, 461 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Incompetency]. For example, a defendant deemed
incompetent to stand trial because he suffers from amnesia would not be so dangerous or

mentally ill that he would require custodial care. This problem has been noted both with
respect to criminal defendants and civil committees. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective
Mental Treatment, 62 CAL. L. REV. 936, 941-48 (1974).

129.

See Janis, supra note 117, at 724.
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care,'3 " which does not lead to eventual recovery and trial. On the
other hand, in less serious cases the probability of recovery may
indeed be hampered by confinement in an institution.'3' In sum,
confinement has frequently either failed to produce ultimate competency or has directly hampered the attainment of competency,
and thus prolonged rather than shortened the length of time before
a trial could be held, without significantly benefiting the individual. 3 ' These criticisms were recently underscored in Jackson v.
Indiana,'33 which held that indefinite commitment, at least where
no viable treatment plan was provided, violated equal protection
and due process.'34
130. See id. at 722 & nn.9 & 10. It has been observed-that the criminal insane are given
low-budget priority by legislators and often a criminal stigma attaches to the incompetent
defendant, making him an unsatisfactory patient for the medical staff. Eizenstat, supra note
121, at 382.
131. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 204, 255 A.2d 519, 521 (1969). The low priority
given to defendants and the criminal mentally ill in terms of treatment is evidenced by two
studies made of Pennsylvania's Farview State Hospital. In 1961, law students who had
examined the institution concluded: "It is difficult to deny that the type of psychiatric treatment available at Farview State Hospital, as well as that actually given, is inadequate.
Patients at Farview are fed, clothed, cared for and amused but few of them are treated."
Hospitalization,supra note 119, at 107.
Public and governmental interest in Farview was revived more than 15 years after this
observation when several deaths had occurred at the institution. Testimony given at committee hearings in 1976 indicates conditions have not materially improved; allegations of murder,
brutality and neglect were presented. Despite attempts by the staff to improve conditions by
formulating a patient care program, in July 1976, Pennsylvania Welfare Secretary Frank Beal
recommended the state shut down the facility. However, combined opposition from the
community surrounding Farview and from the employee union caused the Governor to reverse
the decision. See Valley News Dispatch (Tarentum, Pa.), Nov. 29, 1976, at 3, col. 3.
132. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 218, 255 A.2d 519, 521 (O'Brien, J., concurring). See also Foote, supra note 121, at 832-33; Janis, supra note 117, at 722-36; Incompetency, supra note 128, at 382.
Perhaps a related reason why defendants seek to avoid the incompetency label other than
the indefinite nature of confinement is that, according to studies, persons found incompetent
to stand trial stood a significantly greater risk of being ultimately convicted than persons not
deemed incompetent. Steadman & Braff, Effects of Incompetency Determinationson Subsequent Criminal Processing:Implicationsfor Due Process, 23 CAT. U.L. REv. 754, 757 (1974).
An example of the degree of prejudice the defendant must overcome when he attempts to
challenge an incompetency determination is illustrated in the case of one defendant who tried
unsuccessfully for eight years to be brought to trial, having filed several petitions each year
in his own behalf alleging he had been deprived of due process and his civil and constitutional
rights. Despite the prolific and persistent evidence of his ability to deal with legal matters,
psychiatrists continued to opine that he could not understand legal matters, a conclusion the
courts accepted without discussion. See United States ex rel. Daniels v. Johnston, 328 F.
Supp. 100, 102-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
133. 406 U.S. 713 (1972).
134. The Court concluded that the more lenient commitment standards and more strin-
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A response of the Procedures Act to these criticisms and the
Jackson holding is the incorporation into the common law definition
of incompetency'3 5 of the requirement that the defendant be found
"substantially"'35 unable to understand the nature of the proceedings or assist in his own defense. In addition to qualifying the generalizations embodied in the common law rule, and providing some
guidance to the judiciary, the substantiality requirement suggests
legislative sensitivity to criticisms that the common law rule permitted, and was used to obtain forced treatment and confinement
regardless of whether the treatment would actually make a defendant more competent to stand trial.'37 The requirement is apparently intended to decrease unnecessary commitments. Requiring
that the defendant be substantially unable to understand the nature
of the proceedings may also be a legislative suggestion to the courts
to permit trial of a defendant when the degree of competency is
slight, and may weaken the entrenched judicial belief that a strong
gent release procedures applicable to criminal defendants compared to other mentally ill
persons deprived the defendant of equal protection of the laws and amounted to due process
violations where the commitment is based solely on incompetency to stand trial, without a
determination that commitment would enable the defendant to regain competency in the
foreseeable future. Id. at 723-28.
A tragic instance of such confinement was that of a retired Air Force colonel, charged in a
first offense with passing bad checks, who was confined in a mental hospital based on the
opinion of psychiatrists that the charge resulted from a mental condition brought on by
financial reverses. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). Unable to see an end to his
indefinite confinement, he committed suicide. See Arens, Due Process and the Rights of the
Mentally Ill: The Strange Case of Frederick Lynch, 13 CATH. U.L. REV. 3, 38 & n.126 (1964).
At least two Pennsylvania judges have suggested the possibility that indefinite commitment results in a denial of due process. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 214-219,
255 A.2d. 519, 524 (1969) (O'Brien, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Klinger, 255 Pa. Super.
Ct. 505, 511, 258 A.2d 668, 670-71 (1969) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Pifer,
215 Pa. Super Ct. 125, 256 A.2d 878 (1969) (Hoffman, J., dissenting). See also Janis, supra
note 117, at 723.
135. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Under the 1966 Act, the
common law test was broadened to allow the court to consider a wide range of factors in
addition to the defendant's minimal ability to understand and assist in his defense. The
statute provided:
In making such an order, the court shall give due regard to the capacity of such
person to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own condition in reference to the proceedings, to understand the nature of
the punishment which might be inflicted upon him, to confer with his counsel with
reference to such proceedings, to make a rational defense, and the probable effect of
the trial on such person's physical and mental condition.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408(d) (Purdon 1969).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
137. See Eizenstat, supra note 121, at 390-92.
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showing of competency is required. 3 ' The substantiality requirement therefore appears consonant with the purposes of the competency rule-to protect the defendant from an essentially unfair trial
while limiting the effects of a delay in the criminal proceedings.
Following the dictates of Jackson, the Act further requires that
once there is a finding of incompetency, the committing court must
be reasonably certain that the treatment it orders will help the
defendant to attain competency to stand trial.139 This provision may
have little practical effect. It seems unlikely that psychiatrists will
admit there is no possibility that the defendant will be helped by
some kind of treatment, and unless that opinion is expressly articulated a judicial finding that treatment is feasible seems certain.
Furthermore, the less able a defendant is to understand the nature
and object of the trial, the greater the likelihood the court will
conclude the defendant needs the intensive kind of treatment provided by total institutionalization.10 These considerations may be
partially balanced by statutory provisions requiring periodic review
of the patient's condition and an individualized treatment plan."'
138. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378-86 (1966); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 456
Pa. 313, 319, 318 A.2d 724, 727 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 205, 255 A.2d
519, 522 (1969); Commonwealth v. Smith, 227 Pa. Super Ct. 355, 364, 324 A.2d 483, 488-89
(1974).
139. The section for involuntary treatment provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article II of this Act (emergency and courtordered civil commitment) a court may order involuntary treatment of a person found
incompetent to stand trial but who is not severely mentally disabled, such involuntary
treatment not to exceed a specific period of thirty days. Involuntary treatment pursuant to this subsection may be ordered only if the court is reasonably certain that
the involuntary treatment will provide the defendant with the capacity to stand trial.
The court may order outpatient treatment, partial hospitalization or inpatient treatment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
The 1966 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act impliedly suggests automatic commitment was the anticipated effect of an incompetency finding. For example, the only way
criminal proceedings could resume was if continued confinement was no longer necessary
after a finding of incompetency. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4408(a), 4409(a) (Purdon 1969);
but see id. § 4408(e) (permitting partial hospitalization of an incompetent defendant). Courts
also seem to have presumed confinement was automatic, particularly where the defendant is
charged with a violent crime or crimes. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 255
A.2d 519 (1969).
140. See note 127 supra.
141. After the initial thirty-day treatment allowed for all incompetent defendants, civil
commitment is authorized only for specific felonies. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit, 50, § 7304(g)
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See also notes 144-50 and accompanying text infra. It has been
suggested that the defendant can be examined for incompetency and to determine whether
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Although they do not aid in the initial determination of whether
confinement is necessary, these provisions at least require the state
to periodically justify continued confinement of the individual
awaiting trial.
A final restraint imposed on automatic commitment is the Act's
identification of specific crimes for which confinement is appropriate. While it clearly indicated that there were due process limitations on confinement of the, incompetent defendant, the Jackson
Court failed to define the type of conduct that would warrant confinement for mental treatment or the maximum time such confinement could be imposed without requiring either release or trial. It
did, however, clearly require the commitment tobe justified by the
defendant's alleged conduct or his asserted future ability to stand
trial."' This latter position is explicitly developed under the Procedures Act; an incompetent defendant is not automatically assumed
committable irrespective of the crime for which he is charged. In
response to Jackson, the legislature created a special sub-group of
civil committees whose commitment is essentially justified because
of alleged criminal conduct"' involving serious harm to another person. Thus, persons found incompetent to stand trial who are
charged with murder,"' involuntary manslaughter,' aggravated
assault,"' kidnapping," 7 rape,"8 or involuntary deviate sexual intercourse"' may be committed for a period of one year under the civil
provisions of the Act.'15
Although confinement for one year is considerably less than the
period incompetent defendants could be confined in the past, competent defendants awaiting trial for a number-of these offenses norsuccessful treatment can be made in roughly the same time allowable for emergency detention. See Janis, supra note 117, at 736.
142. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
143. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(g) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
144. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1973).
145. Id. § 2503.
146. Id. § 2702.
147. Id. § 2901.
148. Id. §§ 3121(1), (2).
149. Id. §§ 3123(1), (2).
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(g) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). See also MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.966(11) (1972) (requiring civil commitment when it appears likely the defendant
will not regain his competency in eighteen months). Recent psychiatric studies indicate that
a reasonable time is six months initially, with a possible six-month extension. See Janis,
supra note 117, at 739 & n.99.
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mally have a right to bail and persons civilly committed for similar
conduct may be confined for only ninety days. 15' Thus, the incompetent defendant is not treated substantially the same as the competent defendant or the civil committee. The provision also fails to
take sufficient notice of the fact that an incompetent defendant may
have important rights to be vindicated within the criminal justice
system that are not present in the case of a civil commitment 52 and
which may be jeopardized by delay in trial. Finally, the automatic,
technical application of commitment for crimes specifically identified may mean that the goal of confinement-enabling the defendant to attain competency-may be ignored.
New procedural safeguards provided incompetent defendants
prior to commitment at least partially rectify these problems, since
they are designed to ensure fairness in the determination of incompetency. A petition to halt the trial'proceedings to determine the
question of competency may be made only by the court, Commonwealth, defense, or persons charged with custody of the defendant. 15
In addition, the Act states that an examination shall be ordered by
the court where there is a clear question of incompetency.' 54 Once
such a question is presented to the court, 155 an examination may be
151. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §'7304(g) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
152. For example, the defendant may want to remove the criminal cloud on his name, or
to prevent the loss of exculpatory evidence threatened by a delay of the trial.
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7402(c),(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). Under the 1966
Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act, the initial petition for incompetency hearing could
be made by "any interested party." See PA. STAT.-ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4407, 4408(a) (Purdon
1969). It is possible that a party, such as a relative, although nominally "interested," might
have some personal reason for not seeking a trial, and is able to have that personal interest
satisfied, while ostensibly acting on behalf of the defendant. The reason generally advanced
to allow competency to be raised over the objections of the defendant is that "it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive'
his right to have a court determine his capacity to stand trial." Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 384 (1966). However, extending the rule to allow anyone to raise the competency issue
may lead to potential abuse, as where the prosecution seeks to have a competency examination as a means of obtaining information about the defendant's capacity at the time of the
crime. The need for the incompetency rule may not be as great today; when it was first
developed the right to counsel was not available. Thus, it has been argued that defense
counsel should be allowed to make the decision to go to trial, where, for example, the maximum criminal penalty for the offense charged would be less than the maximum amount of
time necessary to determine competency. See Incompetency, supra note 128, at 467-68.
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(d) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
155. The Act provides no definition of what would constitute a prima facie question of
incompetency. At least the court's interest shouldbe aroused either by the nature of the
alleged crime or surrounding circumstances, the defendant's prior medical history, or the
defendant's conduct during the trial or earlier stages of criminal proceedings. See Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378-84 (1966).
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ordered to be conducted by at least one psychiatrist. 5 ' During the
examination, the defendant must be warned that he does not have
to answer any questions or perform any tests,'57 and has the right to
have counsel present during the psychiatric interview.'SS As in civil
commitment, the defendant is permitted to have his own expert
review the conclusions of the court-appointed psychiatrist; if he is
indigent, the state must provide funds enabling him to retain an
expert.'59 The court must make a determination on the competency
issue within twenty days'8 0 of the hearing, and must find "clear and
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(e)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). The 1966 Act provided
that the court could either have the person examined by two physicians, or by a sanity
commission composed of two physicians and an attorney. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4408(b)
(Purdon 1969). The Procedures Act appears to reflect the belief of the draftsmen that psychiatrists would be able to form sounder opinions and provide better expert testimony at the
hearing.
157. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). There is a waiver of
the privilege to remain silent if the defendant has moved for or consented to the incompetency
hearing. Id. The Act apparently leaves intact specific rules of evidence in regard to the
incompetency hearing itself, such as the rule that hearsay evidence in a psychiatrist's report
may be admitted. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 206, 255 A.2d 519, 522 (1969)
(elimination of hearsay would unnecessarily impede the diagnosis and ultimately result in a
detriment to the accused). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 44, 52, 246 A.2d 356,
361 (1968) (hearsay evidence permitted in a commitment of a mentally defective juvenile
under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1062(9) (Purdon 1969)). In Bruno, the court argued that strict
rules of hearsay need not be adhered to because of the "non-criminal" nature of the incompetency hearing. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 435 Pa. 200, 206, 255 A.2d 519, 522 (1969). Ironically,
labeling civil commitment as non-criminal has not been persuasive when courts have considered the question in civil hearings since, according to the courts, the reason for eliminating
hearsay in a criminal context-removal of inherently unreliable information-is the same in
the context of civil commitment. See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Hawaii
1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 173-74, 339 A.2d 764,
773-74 (1975), appeal denied, 424 U.S. 960 (1976).
Although waiver of the right to remain silent follows the general procedure in a criminal
trial, courts have seldom articulated a rationale for the waiver other than the state's need
for the information. Note, Requiring a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government
Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv.
L. REV. 648, 667 (1970).
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(e)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
159. The civil committee is given the "right" to such expert assistance but an incompetent defendant may have it only where he has a substantial objection to the determination
of the court-appointed psychiatrist. Compare id. § 7402(f), with id. § 7304(d).
All three of the specific rights granted the defendant in the Act, the right to remain silent,
the right to have counsel present during the interview, and the right to expert witnesses,
militate against frequently made criticisms that courts overrely on medical opinions although
incompetency is essentially a legal question and psychiatrists tend to give disproportionate
weight to the defendant's need for treatment. See Incompetency, supra note 128, at 470-71.
160. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7402(g) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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convincing evidence" of incompetency in order to commit. "' This
substantially modifies prior case law that incompetency could be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence. " 2
In summary, the Procedures Act acknowledges the due process/equal protection limits on automatic confinement and responds
to the recognition that automatic confinement may not guarantee
the achievement of its stated goals. This acknowledgement is demonstrated by the addition of the substantiality requirement to the
common law definition of incompetency, by requiring the courts to
determine that treatment is reasonably certain to be successful and
to periodically review such plans, and by limiting automatic confinement to specified crimes. Despite somewhat dissimilar treatment, and seemingly inadequate recognition of some rights of the
incompetent defendant, procedural safeguards do exist under the
Act which prevent a cursory or incompletely based finding of incompetency.
2.

Stay of the Proceedings

As discussed above, one result of a determination of incompetency has been the stay of judicial proceedings.' This result remains, although it has been modified by the Procedures Act which
permits the court to hear any legal objections which may be made
prior to trial without the personal participation of the defendant.,"
161. Id. §§ 7403(a), 7406.
162. The requirement of a fair trial had previously been regarded as so fundamental that
the moving party need only show incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Commonwealth v. Davis, 459 Pa. 575, 330 A.2d 847 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 451
Pa. 483, 488, 305 A.2d 890, 892-93 (1973) (right to a fair trial and a meaningful defense strikes
at the heart of due process; without the ability to consult with counsel, the protection becomes a nullity). The preponderance of the evidence test was criticized in Murel v. Baltimore
City Court, 407 U.S. 355, 359 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4409(a) (Purdon 1969), with id. § 7403(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1977-1978). But under the 1966 Act, the prosecution was permitted to petition the court
to resume the proceedings if the interests of justice required, suggesting the prosecution could
move to dismiss or reduce the charge. See id. § 4409(c) (Purdon 1969). Ironically, the defendant was given no similar right, a situation which the Procedures Act corrects.

164.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,

§ 7403(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). While not specified in

the Act, it has been suggested that courts should hear pre-trial motions regarding such
matters as the insufficiency of the indictment and alibi defenses based on evidence other than
the defendant's testimony. Professor Foote argues that this may be true in three different
situations: first, where the statute of limitations on the crime has run; second, where there is
an unlawful search and seizure or other constitutional infirmity in the prosecution's case;
third, where a complete alibi defense can be made that the defendant was elsewhere at the
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This provision raises the question of whether the defense should be
permitted to raise such preliminary issues as suppression of evidence and to move for a dismissal where such evidence is the only
basis for the prosecution's case. However, even if the criminal
charge was dismissed, it is possible the prosecution could establish
a sufficient case to commit the defendant under the civil provisions
of the Act.'6 5
Further protection of the incompetent defendant is provided by
limiting the length of the stay of proceedings to the shorter of five
years or the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the crime
or crimes charged.' 6 Moreover, the court may dismiss the charges
and order the person discharged if time has affected the criminal
proceedings in such a manner that it would be unjust to resume the
prosecution.'67
B. Detemination of Criminal Responsibility
Where it appears that the defendant, although competent to
stand trial, was so mentally ill at the time of the commission of the
crime that he lacked criminal responsibility, the traditional result
has been acquittal by reason of insanity because imposition of the
time of the crime, proven either by employment or other kinds of records or by testimony of
third parties. Foote, supra note 121, at 841.
The bar against defendant's participation personally in such pre-trial proceedings, however, appears to be contrary to the general purpose of the statutory section to eliminate those
cases where the prosecution would be ultimately dismissed anyway. Moreover, adjudication
of capacity and competency depends on the context in which the issue is raised; and defendant may be competent or have sufficient capacity to testify for certain purposes, e.g.,
memory and recollection, but lack sufficient capacity to adequately assist counsel at time of
trial. See Developments, supra note 14, at 12-14.
It has been suggested that it would be preferable to allow such pre-trial motions to be made
before, not after, the incompetency hearing, in order to give the defendant's counsel an
opportunity to challenge the indictment or raise a defense that would exculpate the defendant. Incompetency, supra note 128, at 468. This would appear consonant with the overall
policy of the Act to avoid unnecessary commitments and needless court proceedings.
165. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7406 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
166. Id. § 7403(f).
167. Id. § 7403(e). It has been asserted that the defendant should be given the opportunity
to challenge the validity of the state's evidence before he is committed in any event. In
addition to allowing specific pre-trial motions, a trial on the merits, followed by a determination of incompetency, has been suggested as a second alternative. See Janis, supra note 117,
at 737. The serious consequences of increasing the number of criminal trials which would
ultimately have to be dismissed has led to the adoption by Wisconsin of a procedure for an
abbreviated trial of the state's evidence, a preliminary hearing where the state must show
probable guilt. See State v. McCredden, 33 Wis. 2d 661, 688-71, 148 N.W.2d 33, 37-38 (1967).
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deterrent and retributive elements of criminal punishment is not
justified." 8 Under the Mental Health-Mental Retardation Act of
1966, civil commitment of a defendant who lacked criminal responsibility for the crime could be made only after the criminal trial and
verdict." 9 The Procedures Act broadens the discretion of the court
in determining when a finding of criminal responsibility can be
made. The defendant's criminal responsibility may be considered at
an incompetency hearing, at which time the court has the discretion
7 0 If the court
to direct a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity.Y
does not find an absence of criminal responsibility at the incompetency hearing, the issue may be raised again at trial,' when the
court may permit the issue to be heard separately' 2 and, in a trial
by jury, the court may submit the issue of criminal responsibility
to a separate jury. 73 when the defendant is acquitted because he
lacked criminal responsibility, the statute then allows the Commonwealth, the defendant, the county administrator, or any other interested party to petition for court-ordered civil commitment.' Finally, once a defendant has been found guilty of a crime, the trial
court, in conformity with prior procedure, is permitted to defer sentencing to examine the defendant for mental disability.' 75 The 1966
Act's provisions allowing confinement when sentencing is deferred
have been amended to require that the examination be made on an
out-patient basis 76 unless the defendant is committed to a facility
under either the emergency 77 or court-ordered' commitment provisions.
These provisions of the Procedures Act regarding confinement
and treatment of the mentally ill charged with a crime again reflect
a legislative concern for equal treatment of mentally ill persons.
But, as was previously discussed, certain incongruities in the Act
168. Uniform Treatment, supra note 17, at 834.
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4413 (Purdon 1969).
170.

Id. §§ 7402(e)(2), (4) (iii), (iv) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). This procedure has been

criticized because of the tendency of examining psychiatrists to confuse the standards of
incompetency and criminal responsibility. Eizenstat, supra note 121, at 389-90.
171. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7404(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
172. Id. § 7404(c).
173. Id.
174. Id. § 7406.
175. Id. § 7405.
176.

Compare id., with id. § 4407 (Purdon 1969).

177.
178.

Id. § 7302 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
Id. § 7304.
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exist. In creating subclasses of persons subject to treatment, the
legislature separates those who have not been criminally charged,
but whose actions caused or threaten bodily harm; those criminally
charged, but who are incompetent to stand trial; and those who
have been found to lack criminal responsibility because of mental
disability at the time of the crime and who continue to need treatment as a result of that disability.
The primary effect in terms of confinement exists in the creation
of two classes, the mentally ill who are civilly committed subject to
confinement for only ninety days, and the mentally ill either competent to stand trial or acquitted of dangerous felonies who may be
confined for as long as one year.'7 9 The rationale of this distinction
is undermined by the fact that the decision to civilly commit or
bring criminal charges is often simply a matter of pros*ecutorial
discretion.' Moreover, subjecting the incompetent defendant to the
same minimum period of confinement as the person acquitted by
reason of insanity results in the incompetent defendant being
treated less fairly than the others. While the person who has been
tried has the benefit of a criminal trial where evidence on the factual
issue must be proved, the incompetent defendant has no such hearing available to him and the criminal charges alone may justify
confinement. Thus, both the person who has been tried and released
of criminal liability and the person not tried who has not had factual
evidence of his conduct presented in court are subject to deprivations of liberty.
Rationalizing the longer period of confinement for the incompetent defendant on the theory he is being treated fails to take into
account the deprivations resulting from an existing criminal charge.
The harshness of such deprivation is recognized elsewhere in the Act
by the fact that confinement in a mental institution is specifically
179. Id. § 7304(g). Commentators have criticized separate treatment for the mentally ill
as unjustified because an accurate prediction of dangerousness is either nearly impossible or
grossly overrated; evidence that shows most individuals released from hospitals for the criminal insane have a lower recidivism rate than felony parolees from prisons has also been
attacked. See Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Scientists: The Perils of the 'CriminalInsane,' 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 258, 261 (1974); Morris, The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive
Philosophy, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1974); Ochberg, Mental Health and the Law:
Partnersin Advancing Human Rights, 123 U. PA..L. REv. 491 (1974).
180. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7304(b), (g) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978). For example,
the prosecution may have sufficient evidence to prove by the clear and convincing evidence
(but not beyond a reasonable doubt) standard that the defendant was responsible for a rape
or assault.
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credited as time served for any prison sentence"s' and, where the
defendant is found incompetent, detention on criminal charges is
limited to the maximum sentence that can be imposed for the
crime."12 The technical application of commitment for certain dangerous crimes enumerated in the Act may lead to a justification for
automatic commitment without considering the needs of each individual, which the Act was intended to prevent.
C.

An Unresolved Issue: The Right to a Speedy Trial

A substantial question which was not dealt with by the legislature
is whether an incompetent defendant who objects to an incompetency hearing can assert his right to a speedy trial."1 3 The statute
does not expressly give the incompetent defendant the right to assert a speedy trial claim, reflecting the long-standing belief that to
try a defendant who is incompetent would violate his right to a fair
trial, a right regarded as more fundamental than the right to a
speedy trial." 4 Pate v. Robinson"' supports the view that conviction
of a defendant while he is incompetent violates due process of law,"
and intimates it may be impossible for an incompetent defendant
to waive his right not to be tried." 7 However, in Jackson v.
Indiana,"'8 the Court suggested that the interests furthered by the
right to a speedy trial may require a state proceeding where the
state's evidence is tested or the accused would be allowed to prove
his innocence."8' Pate, which appears to establish a general rule,
may stand for the more narrow proposition that where evidence of
incompetency is before the court during trial, a sua sponte hearing
on incompetency must be conducted. 10 Jackson's concern for
181.

See id. § 7401(b).

182. See id. § 7403(f).
183. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; see Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 287-88, 263 N.E.2d
109, 112-13 (1970).
184. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
185. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
186. Cf. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956), rev'g 223 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
187. 383 U.S. at 384.
188. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
189. Id. at 740-41, citing with approval People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 III. 2d 281, 263
N.E.2d 109 (1970) (trial was permitted to go forward where it appeared that there would be
no opportunity for the defendant to become more competent and the state had made a
reasonable attempt to rehabilitate).
190. 383 U.S. at 378-86. Pate involved a failure of the trial court to raise the issue of
competency where medical evidence was presented that the defendant had suffered possible
brain damage in an earlier occurrence.
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speedy trial rights suggests, contrary to the inferences to be drawn
from the language of Pate, that the Court may be willing to consider
balancing the right to a speedy trial against the possibility that such
a trial would be unfair, particularly where there is a long delay or
evidence of prosecutorial abuse.
The constitutional confrontation of the defendant's speedy trial
and fair trial rights, has been squarely addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court only in Commonwealth v. Bruno,"' where
delay of trial was justified because its purpose was to treat the
defendant in order to afford an opportunity to defend himself."'
Three justices in Bruno, however, thought some accommodation
should be made when the defendant asserts his right to a speedy
trial while he is technically incompetent. It was noted that the same
reasons supporting the right to a speedy trial-an opportunity to
remove the criminal cloud on the defendant's name, and to prevent
the loss of exculpatory evidence-apply to all criminal defendants
whether competent or not."3
D.

A Suggested Amendment

The Mental Health Procedures Act provides for a limited type of
trial during the civil commitment procedures that must occur when
the state seeks to confine a defendant for specific crimes."' In this
191. 435 Pa. 200, 255 A.2d 519 (1969).
192. Id. at 204, 255 A.2d at 521.
193. Id. at 215, 255 A.2d at 524 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). Justices Cohen, O'Brien and
Roberts indicated that some accommodation should be made to allow the defendant to assert
his right to trial. See id. at 213-27, 255 A.2d at 523-30 (dissenting opinions). Justice Pomeroy,
agreeing that the statute prohibiting trial of a defendant may invite abuse and be a denial of
fundamental fairness to the defendant, stated that the record in the case before the court did
not show such abuse. Id. at 213, 255 A.2d at 532-33 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
The federal courts have almost uniformly held incompetency puts in abeyance any speedy
trial rights. See In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1970) (one year delay no violation);
United States ex rel. Daniels v. Johnston, 328 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (eight year delay
no violation); Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) (eighteen month delay no
violation). However, the right to a speedy trial and due process became compelling in the
case of extraordinary delay where the incompetent defendant was confined in a maximum
security institution for the criminal insane for twenty years. United States ex rel. von Wolfersdoff v. Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Ironically, in his habeas petition,
defendant sought only release from a maximum security facility to an institution for civil
committees.
194. The Act provides that civil commitment proceedings may be initiated and the defendant confined for periods longer than ordinary civil committees when he has been charged
with violent felonies against another person and found incompetent to stand trial. See notes
143-50 and accompanying text supra.
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provision, the legislature has drawn a rational distinction, allowing
for longer periods of confinement for persons mentally disabled and
charged with dangerous felonies than those who are only mentally
ill. However, the civil commitment hearing with respect to incompetent defendants is deficient in two aspects. First, the prosecution
must prove the occurrence of dangerous conduct (in this case, the
felony for which the defendant is charged) only by a clear and convincing standard of proof, rather than by the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard which would be required at trial. Second, other
incompetent defendants who are not charged with a serious crime
and therefore are not civilly committable have no opportunity at all
under the Act to test the prosecution's case against them. It appears
that the legislature's failure to provide the incompetent defendant
with a mechanism to assert his right to a speedy trial is a serious
flaw in the Act. A suggested amendment to the Procedures Act
would be a provision for a hearing where the criminal charge would
be dismissed if the defendant could prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defendant failed to establish his
burden of proof, the criminal charge would remain, but the results
of the hearing would not be determinative of guilt. Although such a
hearing could be criticized as not fostering judicial economy, it is
suggested that the procedure would actually be utilized in only a
minimal number of cases, where the defendant has a substantial
defense.

IV.

CONCLUSION

When a person is found to be unaccountable for his conduct because of mental illness, it must then be determined what kind of
conduct is serious enough to warrant confinement and treatment.
The possibilities are almost limitless; '" the Mental Health Procedures Act permits involuntary confinement for conduct which
threatens or results in personal physical harm which might otherwise be categorized as a serious felony. The requirement that there
be a showing of potential dangerousness evidenced by a recent overt
195. For example, the kinds of conduct included are felonies, violent felonies, any conduct
that would provoke a violent act, any physical violence, or any conduct threatening physical
or psychological harm. See Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some
Observations on the Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE
L.J. 225, 235 (1960).
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act reduces the possibility that needless confinements will result. In
addition, over-reliance on the judgments of medical authorities is
partially avoided by the formulation of more concrete guidelines
setting forth society's judgment as to the nature of conduct which
manifests a potential for harm serious enough to warrant state intervention.
The statute reflects a legislative policy of allowing a mentally ill
person to retain the greatest amount of freedom possible and to
continue his employment, social associations and family life. The
policy of imposing the least restrictive type of treatment on the
mentally ill and requiring the state to release non-dangerous persons
whom it cannot treat obviates criticism of prior legislation which
allowed the purposeless, indefinite confinement of the mentally
ill.'" e But it also places substantially greater burdens on local mental
health centers to provide more intensive care for more people than
was previously given.' 7 To effectuate the policies of the Act the
legislature must provide for increased expenditures for such centers.
With regard to the incompetent defendant, the statute merely
makes explicit that which was implicit in the 1966 Mental HealthMental Retardation Act: involuntary confinement in a mental institution is equivalent to an imposition of a criminal sentence when
the defendant cannot be tried, even though he has never been found
guilty of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, the
failure of the legislature to completely come to grips with this difficult and complex problem has created a gap in an otherwise precise
196. See Burt, Abolition of Incompetency Pleas, 40 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 66, 67 (1972). There
is a related problem that the mentally ill will never be helped and the incompetent defendant
will not be able to regain competency within a reasonable time unless the state is willing to
spend substantial amounts of funds to make definite commitment provisions effective. Id. at
90.
197. State mental health officials estimated 6,000, almost half of the 13,000 persons in
mental hospitals, were not sufficiently dangerous to justify custodial confinement under the
Act. Valley News Dispatch (Tarentum, Pa.), Sept. 8, 1976, at 31, col. 5 & 6. Even before the
potential effect of the new Act had been considered, it had been noted that increasing numbers of persons had been released from mental institutions, spurred largely by mounting costs
of institutional care; concurrent federal funds to individuals had created additional burdens
on local mental health centers which they were not able to meet. See The Wall St. J., Aug.
19, 1976, at 1, col. 1. This trend was apparent in Pennsylvania, where the in-patient population decreased sixteen percent from 1969 to 1972, and an additional thirteen percent from
1972 to 1974. More than half the persons who remained in institutions had been confined for
twenty years or more. See II Governor's Executive Budget 154 (Milton J. Shapp, Governor
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1974).
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and comprehensive legislative scheme. This will result in unequal
treatment of mentally ill persons who are subjected to the criminal
process.
JOYCE MCKEEVER

